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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

RODNEY C . ROSE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
:
-vs-

SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
14013

:
:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Rodney C. Rose, appeals from an order
granting respondent's motion to dismiss entered in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent's motion to dismiss the appellant's petition
for writ of habeas corpus was granted by the judge after the
hearing.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent seeks an affirmation of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s
order dismissing a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n for writ of habeas
corpus.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The appellant, Rodney C. Rose, was judged and sen-,
tenced on a charge of sale of a stimulating drug on April 13,
1972.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of the State

of Utah.

The Court affirmed the conviction on April 26, 1973,

State v. Rose (No. 12974 unpublished).

The appellant then

brought a habeas corpus action in the Second Judicial District
Court.

That writ was denied.

tion for writ of

The appellant then filed a peti-

habeas corpus in the United States District

Court for the District of Utah.
by Judge Willis W. Ritter.

That petition was dismissed

Appellant then filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial District, which
the Court dismissed.

The issues raised in the petition to the

Third District Court were identical to the issues raised in
appellant's petition previously filed in the Second District Court.

-2-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE APPELLANT HAD PREVIOUSLY RAISED
AND HAD AJUDICATED THE SAME OR SIMILAR ISSUES IN A PRIOR
HABEAS CORPUS ACTION.
The habeas corpus rule under which the present action
was filed in the court below is Rule 65B(i) (1953, as amended).
The rule reads in part as follows:
"The complaint shall further
state that the legality or constitutionality of his commitment or
confinement has not already been
adjudged in a prior habeas corpus
or other similar proceeding; and if
the complainant shall have instituted
prior similar proceedings in any court,
state or federal, within the state of
Utah, he shall so state in his complaint,
shall attach a copy of any pleading filed
in such court by him to his complaint,
and shall set forth the reasons for the
denial of relief in such other court.
In such case, if it is apparent to the
court in which the proceeding under
this rule is instituted that the
legality or constitutionality of his
confinement has already been adjudged
in such prior proceedings, the court

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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shall forthwith dismiss such complaint/
giving written notice thereof by mail
to the complainant, and no further
proceedings shall be had on such
complaint." (Emphasis added.)
As provided in Rule 65B (i), a habeas corpus action must be
dismissed if the court determines that the "legality or constitutionality" of the complaint of incarceration has been
previously adjudged.

The rule not only supports the action of

the lower court in the present case, but requires it.
Appellant presented basically three grounds for habeas
corpus relief in the Third District Court:

(a) insufficiency

of the pleadings in that they did not contain the name of the
party to whom a controlled substance was sold; (b) the crime
for which he was convicted was classed as a felony, instead of
a misdemeanor; and (c) his attorney's incompetence due to failure
to perfect an appeal from the Second Judicial District decision
denying habeas corpus. Each of these issues was raised in
the previous habeas corpus petitions.
In the previous Second Judicial District decision on
#

•

habeas corpus, the appellant alleged the following:
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(a) The petitioner was charged
in an information filed in the Captioned
Court alleging the 'sale' of a 'stimulant
drug 1 —amphetamine.
(b) The indispensible question
to whom the alleged 'sale1 was made
remains unanswered by the Record in
the instant case.
-k

*

-k

(1) By the attached controlling
opinion of the majority of the Utah
Supreme Court, it is apparent that the
provision making the Sale of a Stimulant
Drug . . . Punishable as a Misdemeanor —
remained a part of the Laws of the State
of Utah from 1967 to Jan. 1, 1972.
It follows therefrom that the con"
viction of the petitioner for a felony
cannot stand."
Each of these contentions were rejected upon a hearing
before the Honorable Calvin Gould, who in part held that since
the petitioner did not request a Bill of Particulars, the
information was considered sufficient and that the crime was
found to be a felony, not a misdemeanor.
After this unsuccessful action, appellant filed a
petition in the United States District Court for the District
of Utah, Central Division, in which he raised the above contentions, and additionally alleged that his failure to perfect an
appeal from the denial of habeas corpus relief by Judge Calvin
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Gould was the r e s u l t of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel.
In dismissing the action for f a i l u r e t o exhaust s t a t e remedies,
the f e d e r a l court ruled t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o exhaust
s t a t e remedies was not a r e s u l t of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of
counsel*

The Court s t a t e d :
"In the present matter i t i s obvious
from the face of Rose's p e t i t i o n t h a t he
was aware of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of h i s r i g h t
to appeal the s t a t e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s
opinion to the Utah Supreme Court. He
f a i l e d to do s o , and now blames h i s f a i l u r e
on one of the ' t y p i c a l r a v i n g s ' of the
j a i l h o u s e lawyer who prepared his s t a t e
court p e t i t i o n . " Rose v. Smith, C i v i l No.
C 74-76.

The Court ruled further that a p p e l l a n t had f a i l e d t o make the
required showing of incompetence, as s e t f o r t h in T o l l e t t v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
Appellant had previously l i t i g a t e d the issues he r a i s e d
i n h i s habeas corpus a c t i o n in t h e lower courts and h i s a c t i o n
was therefore properly dismissed.

The dismissal required by

Rule 65B(i) avoids the problems t h a t occur when i s s u e s decided
in one cause of action are the subject of a second cause of
action.

This view was expressed by t h i s Court in Bryant v> Turner,

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967):
"Moreover, after judgment is
entered, there is assured a right of
appeal within the proper time to
seek redress for any such error or
transgression of those rights. When
this procedure has been followed the
judgment should normally be final.
It should not be subjected to a.
continual merry-go-round of collateral
attacks upon various and specious
pretexts as some courts are prone to
permit nowadays. In our opinion such
an inconsiderate attitude toward final
judgments regularly arrived at by
courts of competent jurisdiction robs
the law of the dignity and respect it
is entitled to. It tends to degrade the
whole process of law enforcement and the
administration of justice and thus to undermine the good order of society it is purposed to maintain."
This view has also been expressed by the United
States Supreme Court in cases which deal with the inappropriate ness of repetitious habeas corpus petitions.

Two United States

Supreme Court cases, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Murch
v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972), indicate that attempts by state
prisoners to bring repetitious petitions are not to be approved

v

-7-
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when an orderly procedure exists for petitioners to follow.
Such an orderly procedure exists in Utah for the filing of
a single habeas corpus petition.

The piecemeal and/or

repetitious filing of petitions is uncalled for in light of
Rule 65B(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, it is clear that appellant's writ of habeas
corpus was correctly dismissed because the same issues had
been raised and adjudicated in a prior habeas corpus action.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE APPELLANT RAISED OR SHOULD
HAVE RAISED THE ISSUE OF SENTENCING IN HIS PREVIOUS APPEAL TO
THIS COURT.
Appellant's substantive contention in this appeal
appears very much like the contention on appeal from appellant's
original conviction.

On appeal from conviction of the crime

appellant argued that the drug named in the information, and
upon which he stood convicted, "methamphetamine, '* was at
variance with the charge upon which he was bound over to the
district court, and with the evidence as to the drug he sold,

-8-
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which was "amphetamine."

This Court stated, "We are un-

impressed by this technical distinction and . . . affirm
his conviction," State v. Rose/ supra.

In this appeal,

appellant contends that the sentence for violation of the
statute was a misdemeanor and not a felony based on passage
of the new statute between the date of appellant's prosecution
and the date of sentencing.

Thus, the ultimate issue in both

cases dealt with the proper sentencing of appellant.

If the

court finds that the issues in both appeals are substantially
similar, then this appeal is merely a substitute for the
appellant's previous appeal, and, under Utah law, cannot be
granted.

Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968) ;

Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967); Burleigh V.
Turner, 15 Utah 2d 118, 388 P.2d 412 (1968) ; Duran v. Turner,
30 Utah 2d 249, 516 P.2d 353 (1973) ; Zumbrunnen v. Turner,
27 Utah 2d 428, 498 P.2d 34 (1972).

Nevertheless, if the

issues are not substantially similar, then the question of
proper sentencing under the new statute should have been
raised in the first appeal, and by raising it now, appellant
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has chosen the wrong time to challenge an issue which occurred
months prior to his first appeal.

Therefore, on either grounds,

the petition was properly dismissed.
Appellant knew of his right to appeal his sentence
since the transcript reflects that "petitioner declined to
have his penalty altered after that hearing contending that
this might disrupt his parole schedule, and, therefore, asked
the court to take no further action in the matter of penalty
alteration."

(Tr.45).

Respondent wonders, in a situation like

the present case, at what time in the proceedings "these petitioners out at the prison are to be bound by what they say. . . ."
(Tr.45).

The trial judge also correctly analyzed appellant's

position when he stated, "Assuming I deny his petition on the
same issues (those raised in the Second District Court), are you
saying that he has the right to go from one District to another
filing one petition after another?" (Tr.42) . The trial judge
correctly responded in the negative by dismissing appellant's
petition.
CONCLUSION
Because appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus
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raised issues that had previously been adjudicated in a
habeas corpus proceeding and were either raised or should
have been raised in a previous appeal from the conviction,
the trial court properly granted respondent's motion to
dismiss the petition.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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